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Abstract
With the great success in simulating many intelligent behaviors using
computing devices, there has been an ongoing debate whether all conscious
activities are computational processes. In this paper, the answer to this
question is shown to be no. A certain phenomenon of consciousness is
demonstrated to be fully represented as a computational process using a
quantum computer. Based on the computability criterion discussed with
Turing machines, the model constructed is shown to necessarily involve a
non-computable element. The concept that this is solely a quantum effect
and does not work for a classical case is also discussed.
1 Introduction.
Research in the field of artificial intelligence, which attempts to imitate and
simulate intelligent activities using a machine, has blossomed along with the
development of information technology [1]. Because the study of artificial in-
telligence has provided many insights into intelligent behaviors such as pattern
recognition, decision theory, etc., there is a question whether consciousness or
self-awareness could emerge out of a computational system, a view termed as
strong artificial intelligence. This question can be rephrased and stated as fol-
lows: Are all conscious activities computational processes?. In this paper, the
answer to this question is shown to be no.
In order to examine the computability of a physical phenomenon, the phe-
nomenon should first be represented as a computational model; subsequently,
the computability of this particular model can be examined. The physical phe-
nomenon can then be claimed to be computable or not based on this examina-
tion. A similar approach will be taken in order to examine the computability
of consciousness. Because consciousness is a phenomenon experienced by an
observer, representation of consciousness as a computational process will be
attempted and its computability will be examined. Although traditional ap-
proaches for studying consciousness have included neuroscience [2] or neural
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Figure 1: Turing machine. A Turing machine is an abstract model of a comput-
ing system consisting of internal states, a tape containing symbols in each cell
and a head that reads and writes the symbol. Evolution in time of the Turing
machine is described by (I, a) → (I ′, a′, d) where I is the internal state, and a
is a symbol written on the tape. At the ith cell, i.e., the head’s position, the
head reads the symbol a, and, with the instruction I, it writes a new symbol,
a′, and moves either one cell to the left (d = −1) or to the right (d = +1) with
an updated internal state, I ′. The initiation and termination of computation
are indicated by internal states, h0 and h1, respectively.
network modeling [3, 4], it is demonstrated that a quantum system to be pre-
sented below, it necessarily involves a conscious, as opposed to a physical, ac-
tivity of an observer observing the unitary dynamics of a quantum state. Based
on this observation, a particular quantum computer can be built such that it
yields a computational model involving consciousness. Using logic similar to
that in Turing’s haling problem, it can be shown that this computational model
necessarily runs into a contradiction. As a result, this effectively provides a
counter-example to the assumption that all conscious activities are computa-
tional processes.
In this paper, it is not claimed that all conscious activities can be con-
structed, using a quantum computer, nor that they are quantum mechanical.
Instead, it will be argued that the quantum system to be presented necessar-
ily involves a certain conscious activity and that quantum theory provides a
full description of this particular conscious activity. This argument will be
used to build a quantum computing machine such that it suffices to provide a
counter-example. A single counter-example is sufficient to prove the assumption
is incorrect.
2 Computability and Turing machine.
In order to discuss computability of consciousness, let us first consider what it
means to be computable. This can be done using the notion of Turing machines.
A Turing machine, denoted as TM, is a theoretical model of dynamic computing
system configured with an internal state, a tape containing a symbol in each cell
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and identification of the position of the head on the tape (see Fig. 1). The time
evolution of the TM is described by (I, a) → (I ′, a′, d) where I is the internal
state, a a symbol in the cell of the tape, and d = ±1. Therefore, at the ith cell,
the head reads the symbol, a. Then, given the current internal state, I, which
provides an instruction, the new symbol, a′ = I(a), is written, and the internal
state is updated to I ′ and the head moves either one cell to the right (d = +1)
or one cell to the left (d = −1), i.e., to the (i+ d)th cell.
Among the functions of the internal state, is the indication of initiation and
termination of computation. Initially, this particular state is set to h0, indicating
the initiation of the computation. After the computation is completed, the state
is set to h1 and the machine ceases its activity. The output of the computation
corresponds to the symbol in the cell where the head is located when the machine
halts. For a given input, i, the TM runs, following the time evolution described
above, and either (A) produces an outcome, f = TM(i), and halts with the
internal state set to h1 or (B) loops forever and the internal state never reaches
h1. A system is called computable if it corresponds to a TM such that it follows
either (A) or (B) for a given input i, and is called non-computable otherwise.
The issue of computability is considered in the following setup: suppose T
is defined to have the following two properties:
1. Computable: T (i) when i 6= T
2. Non-computable: T (i) when i = T
That is, T corresponds to a TM that follows either (A) or (B) except when the
input is T , i.e., the description of T , itself (see Fig. 2). In the following ap-
proach, the manner in which the computational model involving consciousness
may be defined through T will be shown using a quantum computing machine,
such that the two conditions regarding computability are satisfied, i.e. neces-
sarily containing non-computability.
3 The halting problem.
Before proceeding with the discussion of consciousness, it is instructive to review
Turing’s halting problem [5] and to examine its use of a property similar to
that seen in T , such that the problem was shown to be non-computable. The
situation for the halting problem is as follows: for some TMs, an outcome
indicated by the halt internal state h0 → h1, is computed, while for some other
TMs, with a given input, the computation loops forever indicated by a constant
internal state, h0. Turing’s halting problem asks if there is a TM that can
distinguish between the two types given an arbitrary TM and an input. Suppose
there is such a TM that performs a calculation given the description of TM and i
such that it is able to determine if TM halts or not. This assumption then makes
it possible to construct a particular TM, TMH, such that the machine does not
halt, for an input TM, if and only if TM(TM) halts. However, a contradiction
follows for TMH when the input is TMH itself, because TMH(TMH) does not
halt, if and only if, TMH(TMH) halts.
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Figure 2: Computability and Non-computability. T is defined to have the prop-
erty corresponding to a Turing machine that either halts or not unless it is given
an input of T itself. The halting problem can be defined in association with T ,
such that it necessarily is non-computable. Similarly, quantum theory allows
consciousness to be represented as a computational process in terms of T , such
that it would necessarily consist of a non-computable element when the input
is T itself.
Therefore, by identifying the TMH associated with the hypothetical TM that
could decide if an arbitrary TM would halt on a given input, it is possible to
show that the TMH contains an element that neither halts after completing the
computation nor loops forever as should a valid TM. The constructed TMH has
the same property as T in Fig. 2, i.e., it is computable except when the input
is TMH itself.
4 Conscious activity in quantum system.
In order to represent a phenomenon of consciousness as a computational model,
the manner in which a conscious activity is involved in a quantum system is
first discussed. This will be conducted using the notation of a qubit, a two-level
quantum system. A qubit in a density matrix form is written as |ψ〉〈ψ| = 1
2
(1+
µˆ · ~σ) where µˆ = (µx, µy, µz) = (sin θ cosφ, sin θ sinφ, cos θ) and ~σ = (σx, σy, σz)
with σx = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|, σy = −i|0〉〈1| + i|1〉〈0|, and σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|.
Therefore a qubit, |ψ〉〈ψ|, can be represented as a unit vector µˆ = (µx, µy, µz)
pointing in (θ, φ) of a sphere with 0 ≤ θ ≤ π, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2π. In quantum
theory, there is another important variable called an observable. For a single
qubit, an observable can also be written as a unit vector, νˆ = (νx, νy, νz) =
(sinϑ cosϕ, sinϑ sinϕ, cosϑ), pointing (ϑ, ϕ) direction in a sphere. Therefore if
one is to make a measurement in (ϑ, ϕ) direction, the observable would be νˆ ·~σ.
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Representing a qubit and an observable as unit vectors in the Bloch sphere will
make their visualization easier which will be helpful in the following discussions.
Let us consider one particular phenomenon, denoted as P1, and described
as follows: an observer observes the unitary evolution of a qubit, µˆ, with respect
to the observable, νˆ. The observer is observing the evolution of µˆ indirectly
and a measurement can be followed in order to confirm the evolution. When a
measurement on µˆ, with the observable, νˆ, is made, it yields a real eigenvalue
that can be directly observed by the observer. Before discussing the description
of the phenomenon, P1, using the dynamics of quantum theory, it is necessary
to illustrate why the phenomenon, P1, necessarily involves a conscious activity
of the observer. An observable serves as a coordinate or a reference frame
when the measurement is made on a given state vector [6]. This concept is
easier to visualize with two unit vectors, µˆ and νˆ. The unit vector representing
an observable, i.e., νˆ, is serving the role of a coordinate for the unit vector
representing a qubit, µˆ. Because the measurement is performed by an observer,
the observable is considered to be a coordinate or a reference frame of the
observer, for a given qubit µˆ.
However, in quantum theory, observables, being a reference frame of the
observer, are fundamentally different from reference frames in classical physics.
In quantum theory, the state vectors have representation in, and evolve in, the
Hilbert space, a complex vector space. This description was invented in order to
correctly predict the outcome of measurement performed on a state vector which
yields a real eigenvalue outcome. Not only do state vectors reside and evolve in
the Hilbert space, so do the observables. Because the observables correspond
to the reference frame of the observer and they exist in the complex Hilbert
space, it must be concluded that, unlike reference frames in classical physics,
quantum observables correspond to an observer’s reference frame in thought.
That is, an observable should be considered to represent the conscious status of
an observer while observing a given state vector. This argument explains why
the phenomenon, P1, necessarily involves a conscious activity.
The qubit in P1 can be any 2-level quantum system, for example, a spin 1/2-
particle or any quantum system in 2-levels, etc. However, it is not necessary
to specify all properties of the physical system other than µˆ, because µˆ is a
pure state and is disentangled from the state that represents other properties of
that quantum system. Therefore, as far as the phenomenon, P1, is concerned,
µˆ provides a full description of the physical system. The same logic applies
to νˆ as well. The vector, νˆ, is not entangled with vectors representing other
observables. Therefore, νˆ must provide a full description of the conscious status
of the observer in phenomenon, P1. That is, similarly to the case with µˆ, it
is not necessary to be concerned with other conscious activities of the observer
because νˆ is disentangled from them. Therefore, P1 not only necessarily involves
a conscious activity of the observer, νˆ gives a full description of the conscious
activity as far as the phenomenon, P1, is concerned.
Quantum theory provides two approaches in describing the natural phe-
nomenon P1. Given µˆ and νˆ, the first is by applying a unitary operation to
the qubit with µˆ′ = UµˆU † where a measurement would yield the expectation
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value of νˆ · µˆ′. The second is by applying a unitary operation to the observable
as νˆ′ = U †νˆU and a measurement would yield νˆ′ · µˆ. That is, quantum theory
insists that, in order to have an observer observe the unitary transformation
of µˆ with respect to νˆ, either a unitary transformation is applied to the qubit,
i.e., the first approach, or the observer’s reference frame νˆ is changed, i.e., the
second approach. The first approach is called the Schro¨dinger picture and the
second corresponds to the Heisenberg picture.
In the second approach, it was the observable that went through a unitary
transformation which should describe the same phenomenon, P1, as the first
approach. Because the evolution of observables through unitary transformations
are performed in the Hilbert space and the observable is the observer’s conscious
status inP1, an observable that is being changed must correspond to a conscious
activity of an observer. However, while the observer’s conscious status is being
changed, the observer is not observing the observable but the state vector, µˆ.
Therefore, this approach also yields the description of the natural phenomenon,
P1, just as in the first approach.
5 Conscious activity in quantum computing pro-
cess.
So far, it has been argued that the phenomenon, P1, necessarily involves an
observer’s conscious activity and quantum theory provides a full description of
the conscious status of the observer regarding P1. Based on these observations,
a quantum computational model is to be constructed such that it represents a
phenomenon involving a conscious activity and its computability will be exam-
ined. In particular, T will be defined in terms of this computational model and
the computability for a given input, i, will be examined. In the next section, it
will be argued that when the input is T itself, it represents consciousness and
will be proven to be non-computable similarly to the halting problem.
Let us review basic elements of quantum computation by following the dis-
cussion in [7, 8]. The particular class of quantum computers to be considered
is assumed to perform a computation on an input of a single qubit, i.e., a
unit vector in the Bloch sphere, µˆs, in which the subscript, s, is placed in
order to distinguish it from the halt qubit to be defined shortly. In this par-
ticular class, the computation is assumed to be conducted through a unitary
process on a given single input qubit, a rotation about the y-axis by δ, i.e.,
Uy ≡ cos
δ
2
|0〉〈0|− sin δ
2
|0〉〈1|+sin δ
2
|1〉〈0|+cos δ
2
|1〉〈1|. Among the components
of the classical TM, the head exists which reads each cell on the tape (see Fig.
1). The head in the classical TM may correspond to the observables in the
quantum computer. As demonstrated earlier, for a single qubit, the observable
can also be written as a unit vector in the Bloch sphere, which will be denoted
as νˆs.
As suggested in [8], in addition to the system input qubit, an additional qubit
is placed which indicates if the computation on the system qubit has successfully
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ended by 0 → 1 after a valid computation on the single system qubit which
remains 0 otherwise. This is equivalent to the classical TM in which its internal
state indicates if the machine completed its computation by h0 → h1. The halt
qubit is set to point at the z-direction, i.e. µˆh = (0, 0, 1). The corresponding
observable, νˆh = (0, 0, 1), also set to point at the z-direction, initially. Therefore,
the quantum computer constructed for a given input µˆs, is a closed system
consisting of µˆs, νˆs, µˆh, and νˆh. Because there is freedom to set the observable,
it can be used to identify one particular quantum computer which works on
a given input, µˆs. Among the infinitely many choices of νˆs, assume that one
particular quantum computer exists with the observable, νˆs = (0, 0, 1). Because
the unitary evolution will be Uy only, the initial observable fully characterizes
this particular quantum computer and it will be defined as T .
The quantum model constructed operates on a single qubit, and, only a
single operation, i.e., Uy, is considered. Therefore, there is no need to specify
any internal state that yields an instruction because there is only one operation.
The only internal state needed is the indication of initiation and termination of
the computation that is represented with the halt qubit. Moreover, indication
of the position of the head is unnecessary because there is only one qubit, which
corresponds to a tape with a single cell. Therefore, the quantum computer
constructed corresponds to a very simple case of a quantum mechanical TM.
One particular phenomenon, denoted as P2, is considered as follows: an
observer observes a rotation of the input, µˆs, about the y-axis by δ, with re-
spect to νˆs. As in P1, the observer is observing the rotation indirectly and
a measurement on µˆs with the observable, νˆs, can be followed to confirm the
evolution. Note that P2 is almost identical to the phenomenon, P1, except the
unitary operation is specified as Uy. Therefore, similarly to the case with P1,
the phenomenon, P2, necessarily involves a conscious activity of the observer,
represented as νˆs. Moreover, as discussed with the instance of P1, νˆs provides
a full description of the conscious status of the observer in reference to P2. In
the following, it will be established that the quantum computer constructed, T ,
represents P2 as a computational model and is computable, therefore indicating
that the phenomenon, P2, is computable.
As discussed earlier, the quantum theory provides two approaches for the
evolution in time of a quantum system. Therefore, because T , the quantum
computer constructed, is a quantum system, it should also evolve in both ap-
proaches. The evolution in time of T with an initial input state, i = µˆs =
(0, 0, 1), will be examined. The first approach, i.e., the Schro¨dinger picture,
is considered as follows: the unitary operation Uy transforms the input as
µˆs → UyµˆsU
†
y and the halt qubit µˆh ≡ (0, 0, 1) halts by transforming into
−µˆh. In the second approach, i.e., the Heisenberg picture, it is the observable
that evolves. Therefore, U †y transforms the vector representing the observable
νˆs into U
†
y νˆsUy and the observable for the halt qubit νˆh ≡ (0, 0, 1) is trans-
formed into −νˆh. Therefore, in the second approach, the observer’s conscious
status νˆs is being changed while the observer observes µˆs. This should yield
the same observation as the first approach. It is noted that the expectation
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value of (U †y νˆsUy) · µˆs for the second approach is equal to the expectation value
in the first approach, νˆs · (UyµˆsU
†
y). Therefore, both the first and the second
computational processes ultimately describe the phenomenon, P2, by correctly
producing an outcome described in P2.
Initially, it was discussed that a system is stated to be computable when it
satisfies one of two criteria, i.e. either (A) it halts after completion of a valid
computation or (B) it loops forever without halting. T was shown to yield the
description of P2, with a given input µˆs, by following both pictures in quantum
theory, i.e., both approaches yielded the outcome by which µˆs rotated about the
y-axis by δ, with respect to νˆs, and halted. Therefore, the phenomenon, P2,
can be claimed to be computable because its computational representation, T ,
with the input µˆs, was shown to be computable by satisfying the criterion (A).
6 Counter-Example to the Assumption.
In case of the Heisenberg picture description of P2, as well as of P1, it was
discussed that the observer is in the conscious status undergoing change, νˆs,
and observes µˆs. This was shown to yield the phenomenon of P2, i.e., the
observer observing the rotation of µˆs. A slightly different case can be considered.
While the observer is in the conscious status, νˆs, that is being changed, the
observer observes νˆs rather than µˆs. This is a peculiar aspect of consciousness–
observing one’s own conscious status–that is not observed in other measurement
experiences, for example, in classical dynamics. This phenomenon can be stated
as follows and denoted as P3: an observer observes a rotation of the input, νˆs,
about the y-axis by δ, with respect to νˆs. Therefore, in P3 which describes
consciousness of the observer, νˆs is serving the role of a state vector, because it
is being observed, and an observable, because it is serving as the reference frame
of the observer. Unlike the cases of P1 and P2, the measurement confirmation
is not needed for P3. While the conscious status, νˆs, is evolving, the observer
is not observing µˆs but νˆs. No measurement is needed in order to confirm the
evolution of νˆs because the observer is already experiencing it as consciousness.
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that T , with an input µˆs,
provides a computational model for describing the phenomenon of P2 and was
shown to be computable. Because P3 is exactly the same as P2 except the
input has changed to vector, νˆs, from µˆs, it follows that T , with an input, νˆs,
must correspond to a computational model representing the phenomenon, P3
(see Table 1). The observable, νˆs = (0, 0, 1), fully characterizes T . Therefore, T
with an input, νˆs, can also be stated as T with an input of the description of T ,
or simply as T with an input, T . In the following, the computability of T for
a given input of T , which represents the phenomenon, P3, as a computational
model, is to be examined.
As established previously, quantum theory provides two approaches to the
evolution in time of T for the input, νˆs, because it is a quantum system where
νˆs corresponds to both a state and an observable. In the first approach, it is
the input system that evolves. Since the input is νˆs, the evolution is as follows,
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Computational Model Phenomenon
(T ,i = µˆs) P2: Observer observes the rotation of µˆs with respect to νˆs.
(T ,i = νˆs) P3: Observer observes the rotation of νˆs with respect to νˆs.
Table 1: Analogy between the computational model, T , and phenomena P2
and P3. If the phenomenon, P2, can be represented as a computational model,
T , with an input, µˆs, then T with an input, νˆs, should correspond to a compu-
tational model for the phenomenon, P3.
νˆs → νˆ
′
s = (sin δ, 0, cos δ), while the halt qubit is transformed as µˆh → −µˆh.
Quantum theory provides a second approach where the same vector, being an
observable, is transformed as νˆs → νˆ
′′
s = (− sin δ, 0, cos δ), while the observable
for the halt qubit is transformed as νˆh → −νˆh. It is noted that νˆ
′
s 6= νˆ
′′
s unless
δ = kπ where k = 0, 1, 2, ....
Let us now discuss the computability of T (i) where i = T . In order for
T (T ) to be computable, it has to follow either the computability criterion (A)
or (B). Since T halted on both approaches, i.e., µˆh → −µˆh, with respect to νˆh,
in both pictures, it must follow (A) rather than (B) in order to be computable.
In order to satisfy (A), the halt qubit of T must have halted accompanied
by a valid computation, i.e., both approaches should yield the same outcome
predicted in P3. However, the two approaches yielded two generally different
outcomes for a single input vector, νˆs. The second approach did not yield the
outcome described in the phenomenon, P3, because the vector is rotated by
−δ. Therefore, this results in a contradiction because T halted on the invalid
computation. The contradiction is noted to result from a peculiar property of
consciousness in which νˆs is serving as a reference frame of the observer and as
a system to be observed.
The assumption states that all conscious activities are computational pro-
cesses. Because T (i), with i = νˆs, being a computational model of the phe-
nomenon P3, is a closed and independent system, this must satisfy the assump-
tion. However, it was shown that T , with a given input νˆs, is not computable.
That is, a particular conscious activity of an observer observing the change of
an observable, as described in P3, is not computable. Therefore, this leads to a
conclusion that the assumption is incorrect, because it suffices to have a single
counter-example to invalidate the assumption.
Perhaps, by considering a larger system that includes the qubit, the contra-
diction may be removed and may yield the result that consciousness is always
a computational process. This is commonly seen in thermodynamics in which
a subsystem violates the second law but this violation is always removed when
the total system is considered. However, this kind of argument would not work
because the evolution considered in P2 and P3 are for pure states. Any attach-
ment of ancilla to T and their interaction with the system qubit would cause
entanglement and this will not properly represent the physical phenomena P2
and P3.
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7 Discussion.
The above argument applies only as a quantum effect. The classical TM cannot
define consciousness using the same technique. As discussed, a reference frame
of quantum measurement was represented in complex Hilbert space which led
to the conclusion that it must correspond to the observer’s conscious status. A
classical measurement yields an outcome in terms of the difference between the
object and the reference frame of an observer, and, unlike consciousness, the
observer cannot observe the dynamics of its own reference frame alone. There-
fore, the same argument used with the quantum computing machine involving
conscious activities cannot be used in a classical case.
In [9], Penrose discussed that a non-computable aspect in consciousness may
exist at the fundamental level as described in Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
Including Turing’s halting problem, there have been a number of mathematical
examples showing undecidability in Go¨del’s theorem. In this paper, it was
demonstrated that, as in Penrose’s suggestion, consciousness is a physical, i.e.,
rather than mathematical, example of Go¨del-type proofs.
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